David is probably best known as the co-author of Testing Business Ideas which he co-authored with Alexander Osterwalder. However, he’s had an incredible impact on innovation both at startups and large companies. He helped GE develop their infamous FastWorks program in partnership with Eric Ries. He also coached emerging product teams at Adobe and even helped Toyota apply the Lean Startup practices to their innovation groups. Before his transition into consulting, David spent over 10 years of his career at technology startups, and he stays connected to the startup scene today through his work at several Silicon Valley accelerators.
- Precoil (David’s consulting firm)
- Testing Business Ideas (Amazon)
- David’s Twitter Account
- David’s Instagram Account
Sean Ammirati (00:08):
Welcome to Agile Giants, Lessons From Corporate Innovators. I’m Sean Ammirati, your host, co-founder and director of the Carnegie Mellon Corporate Startup Lab and partner at the early stage venture capital fund, Birchmere Ventures.
Sean Ammirati (00:22):
Each week I’m going to talk to guests who are experts at creating startups inside large corporations. I believe fundamentally a startup within a company is the same as one inside the proverbial garage, a group of entrepreneurs trying to make the world a better place using new ideas and inventions. However, I also believe some of the techniques and processes are just inherently different. This podcast is going to explore those similarities and differences.
Sean Ammirati (00:49):
On this week’s episode of Agile Giants, I’m joined by David Bland, CEO and founder of Precoil and author of the book, Testing Business Ideas, which he co-authored with Alex Osterwalder. David actually pioneered GEs FastWorks program with Eric Ries. I’m sure Eric is a name that all of you are familiar with, but again, the founder of the Lean Startup Methodology. David also coached emerging product teams at Adobe and even helped Toyota apply the Lean Startup practices to their innovation groups.
Sean Ammirati (01:24):
Before his transition into consulting, David spent over 10 years of his career at technology startups, and he stays connected to the startup scene today through his work at several Silicon Valley accelerators. On a personal note, I’ll say that David’s work has certainly influenced me, and if you haven’t read his book, Testing Business Ideas, I’d encourage you to pick up a copy today. I’ll include a link to it in the show notes. Hope you enjoy this week’s conversation with David Bland.
Sean Ammirati (01:56):
So David, thanks for joining me me today, really appreciate you making the time for Agile Giants here. I thought a fun place to start would be, I was thinking, you know, Precoil does a lot of work with startup accelerators and also, you know, how a lot of us know you as your work with large corporates. I thought it’d be fun to start by comparing and contrasting the similarities and differences in the types and the specific experiments businesses should run if they’re a startup or if they’re an innovation group inside of a large company.
David Bland (02:30):
Yeah, it’s a great place to start and thanks for having me. Again, I’m a fan. So the only way I stay sane is having those two worlds overlap quite a bit. So the principles overlap as far as, Hey, is what we’re about to build desirable? So do they want this? Is it viable? Should we do this, and is it feasible, can we do this? And so those principles apply to both. It becomes a question of tactics, and so when you look at the experiments themselves, you know, if I’m working with a hardware manufacturer doing IoT work in a corporate setting, the speed at which they can go and the kind of list of the 44 experiments we have in the book, not all of them apply and they’re really worried about their brand.
David Bland (03:16):
And so some of the companies I work with, you know, their brand is over a hundred years old, so we’re not going to do anything that damages the brand. On the other side, when I’m working kind of with accelerators in the Valley or just virtually now, since we’re all in the time of this COVID thing, they don’t have a brand. I think nobody cares about your brand, just to start off. So they wish people would worry about their brand. So they can be a little more sort of, they kind of push the envelope a little more. So I feel like when I do a lot of corporate work, we’re constantly keeping the brand in mind in ways that we don’t damage it while we’re trying to learn, Hey, should we build a thing?
Sean Ammirati (03:53):
Yeah, and I think you were actually at the company that I first read this, but I saw that sometimes too, the brand can lead to false positives. I remember early in exploring this corporate innovation stuff, reading an article from a consulting firm that I think you were part of actually, about work they did with Toyota and how sometimes the Prius owners would look more optimistic about an idea if the Prius brand was associated with it. So I think that that brand really does cut both ways, you know, as a positive like, Oh, if Prius is doing this, it probably makes sense and I should probably find it interesting, and then obviously, also you don’t want any of the brand damage there as well.
David Bland (04:36):
Correct. And so really quickly, you know, so a couple of things there. One, and so a lot of the work with Neo, you know, I wrote about publicly. Also, I still have some of these companies I work with today and quite often we’re taking a lab’s brand approach or a lightly branded approach because I think what happens in a corporate setting is that as soon as you put your brand on it, you get all this attention, it’s like all this gravity. And you really don’t know if people are checking out, just because again, it’s Toyota doing a thing or are they checking out because it really solves a need they have? And I think you have to be very mindful of that. You’ll attract a lot of customers and go forward thinking, Oh, they really want this, when in reality they were just sort of interested because you are a brand and they want to just see what you’re doing. And there was really no need or job or, you know, pain you’re resolving. And I think it’s a very dangerous spot to be in.
Sean Ammirati (05:30):
Yeah. Yeah, that’s why they’re so protective of that brand, right? They don’t want to lose the momentum that it can generate. How about the differences? Are there things you think of that are just like, okay, this is something that’s really important for a corporate to keep in mind, that’s not as important for a startup, or vice versa? So startups to keep in mind that corporate shouldn’t?
David Bland (05:48):
I think those differences were bigger maybe 10 to 15 years ago, now I find there’s a lot of similarities. So when you look at B2B businesses, for example, if you looked at 10, 15 years ago, you would say, well, a B2B app looks a certain way and behaves a certain way. And now it’s really hard to distinguish them from B to C. You know, so I think what has happened in the market is a lot of the expectations of, well, I use an app for this and this and this, so therefore the B2B things I use should also look and feel that way. I think it’s closed the gap quite a bit. I think some of the biggest differences I’ve seen has been just the sheer amount of customers you have. If you’re a B2B or a corporation and you have eight clients, you’re not going to burn through seven of them interesting ideas, because, you know, you don’t have that many.
David Bland (06:40):
Whereas if you’re a startup B2C and you confuse, let’s say 10,000 consumers, in your early stage trying to figure out what to do, you can recover from that. And so quite often there’s a lot of anxiety I feel like, comes with just the corporate testing that some of it’s warranted, but at the same time we can use techniques that don’t necessarily burn through your seven of your eight customers as well.
Sean Ammirati (07:07):
Yeah, that’s an awesome point. So you’re probably most famous for the book you and Alex wrote, maybe not, maybe you’re more famous for other things, but I think of you most famously for the book you and Alex wrote, Testing Business Ideas. And in this book you have these kind of different 44 experiments that you can use to systematically test ideas with these small bets. I guess, as the guy who kind of authored this, I’m curious, are there types of innovations that you think don’t work well for these type of systematic small bets?
David Bland (07:42):
You know, it’s interesting. I’ve worked with so many different companies over the years that I used to think, Oh, this can’t work in pharma. And then I spent most of last year helping pharma companies. And then I would say, well, this wouldn’t work for, let’s say a COVID response, and then I spend time on teams working with COVID response. So, I feel like you almost look at it as like scientific method. And so you almost have to ask the question, okay, are there certain situations where scientific method wouldn’t make sense? And I still draw a lot of inspiration from Eric Ries here, who I had the pleasure of working with early on in his career and get to know him before he wrote Lean Startup. And, you know, he had this great framing of, you know, if you know the problem and you know the solution, you don’t really need to experiment your way through using scientific method through the solution, if nothing changes and you know what the solution is.
David Bland (08:34):
I feel like where we get in trouble, is when we’ve convinced ourselves we know the solution, but we don’t. And there’s a lot of cultural things to unpack there, you know, leaders in businesses are incentivized and promoted based on sharing what they think they know, or convincing other people that they have the answers sometimes when they don’t. And so I think just being humble and saying, All right, does it make sense to iterate through the problem space here using scientific method? And also, do we even understand the problem and the solution, right? So sometimes where we fall in this trap with Agile, is we think we know the problem and then we iterate through the solution, and I’ve been a part of some amazing Agile teams that we just iteratively delivered things nobody cared about. So, that’s how I got pulled into the problem space.
David Bland (09:21):
So I would say, try not to look at it as to, Well, does it work for this or that, but think about it more like scientific method, are there things here that we need to learn that we would benefit from, a catalog of experiments to learn from? And that I feel like transcends quite a few different industries.
Sean Ammirati (09:42):
Yeah, actually the Eric Ries two by two is amusing to me as someone who spends time as an entrepreneur and an investor, but also a lot of time in business schools. That is like every MBA course, right? I joke that, like, if you don’t put one two by two matrix up in the MBA course, the Dean actually revokes your teaching credentials. So I always try to include one, but like, it is unique. Like when you hit on a two by two that actually really does well represent the problem, how powerful that is and that sort of known unknown problem, known unknown solution, and then Eric’s kind of which box is it in and what’s the right methodology is interesting.
Sean Ammirati (10:23):
You know, as someone who goes and spends a lot of time with these companies, helping them think about these approaches, what are some things you’ve done to kind of help companies culturally buy into this small bet experimentation methodology that may not work with some of the legacy cultural elements inside that business?
David Bland (10:43):
Yeah, well, especially with bigger companies, I mean, they’re big for a reason usually, they got something right. And they were able to, you know, basically scale it and maybe that thing they got right was, you know, from 20 and 30 years ago, sometimes, or even longer ago. And so I try to come in with an attitude of respecting kind of where they’ve been and where they are and not come in and be like, Oh, you need to just throw out everything you’re doing and replace it with this. That’s not my style. So I’m usually saying, Okay, where are you today? Where have you maybe prematurely scaled something that didn’t end well? Maybe there’s a spot where you thought you make a really good decision, but it ended up very poorly. Where are things that you’re experiencing that are high uncertainty? And usually when I take that approach, it’s crazy. I wrote a book about experiments, but I normally don’t lead with the experiments, I talk about risk and investment decisions.
David Bland (11:39):
And so a lot of my questions are around, how do we de-risk this thing you’re working on and how do we make good investment decisions on it? And maybe even use something like metered funding to eventually, you know, scale it when it makes sense. And I haven’t had a lot of pushback on those two topics, it’s when you lead with, Hey, let’s use a new canvas and …
Sean Ammirati (11:59):
David Bland (12:00):
You know, as soon as they think you’re more excited about the tools or the techniques than you are about helping them, I feel like you get shut down, even if that wasn’t your intent. So I’ve learned sort of over the years of framing things in sort of the voice and world of the people I’m interacting with.
Sean Ammirati (12:16):
Yeah. And so risk and metered funding are sort of investment bet decisions, right? I think of that as mostly, you know, the purview of finance and the general managers, right? And it strikes me that like, there’s probably a lot those groups can learn from the other side of the Precoil world where you’re talking to these startup accelerators. What do you think corporate finance can learn from startup accelerator finance?
David Bland (12:51):
That’s a good question. You know, I think when I’m pulled into the accelerator world, I’m often just helping them walk through their business model for the first time. And so I feel like in the Valley, just having spent some time, you know, in the Bay Area for the last 10 years or so, there was this dynamic we were like, let’s put something out there, we’ll figure out the business model later, we got a tension, that’s all we need, we have traction, let’s just raise some funding. And you know, what happens with that sort of like system, and not to kind of get on a rant here, but you keep raising money and you keep putting your competitors out of business because they just can’t seriously compete with you at all, and then you go public, but you still don’t have really a functioning business model, and that worries me. I feel like that leads to almost like, I still am waiting for the moment where one of these startups raise like six series, like funding, went public, put everybody else out of business, but then never could make the financials work and then we have the taxpayer bail them out. Like, that scenario will happen. And I was like-
Sean Ammirati (13:56):
I think that was, We Work, David, but they just barely didn’t get public, but you know, you don’t have to name names, but I feel like there actually are good examples of what you just described is the short way to think about it.
David Bland (14:09):
Yeah, so the way I like to approach it is, Okay, well, how do we, you know, keep the business model front and center when we start off, and so a lot of my accelerator work is, Well, have you thought about your business model? Can you tell a story about it? And it’s really amazing to see entrepreneurs and how their minds work and everything. And, you know, when they can finally tell a coherent story about their model, they get really excited. And I think corporates certainly could learn from that and storytelling, because I think so often it gets distilled into a series of PowerPoints and bullets, and there’s really no story to be had. And I feel like the entrepreneurs I meet, their ability to story tell is really amazing. So I think anybody in the corporate world could learn just from even being around accelerators of just how people are telling their stories, how they’re thinking about risk and just using that to help maybe improve what they’re doing as well.
Sean Ammirati (15:04):
That’s a great point. So on the risk side of the conversation that you’re having with these corporates, right, what’s the hot button issues there to get, you know, the champions to lean in and pay attention so that you then can talk to them about testing these business experiments?
David Bland (15:22):
Yeah, I think Alex does this really well, my coauthor, Alex Osterwalder, when we frame things as a portfolio. And some of that ended up being part of invincible company more than the testing business ideas book, but they’re very much related because we power a portfolio of ideas through the invincible company, through testing business ideas, so they are very related. And a lot of it we’ll just start talking about kind of VC terminology of like how many ideas do you have to invest in to get to like this kind of unicorn thing you’re looking for? And I constantly hear numbers in the single digits and it’s like, No, that’s not … Like if you started, you were sort of incubator inside a corporation and you said, we have three ideas, and this is what we’re going to run with.
David Bland (16:08):
You know, there’s no way, usually, you’re not going to get a big success out of those three ideas. Like you need a hundred ideas or 200 or 250 ideas. And so when I’m talking about just thinking of things as a portfolio, one telling way to find out at a risk point of view is literally how people map out, Okay, where are these things on a portfolio map? And they end up all being kind of sort of like on the only exploit side, which is more of just, Well, it’s incremental innovation and we’re barely, you know, like just iterating on stuff that’s already a known. And then it’s like, What are you creating a new value? Like, what are you unlocking as far as new markets? And there’s almost nothing there. And so it’s just some of like, just helping them visualize what they already experiencing in a way and say, Okay, how would we systematically go from, you know, it’s not like you need more ideas, but as you test these ideas, how would you move them into something that would be more of a, like something you could scale?
David Bland (17:04):
And so quite often I’m pulling from my coauthor there, who’s brilliant at this and kind of learning how he speaks to execs in a ways where we just started framing it as a portfolio. And if all your, you know, all your sustaining business and you have nothing is coming down the road for something completely new, I think it’s just a telling kind of just holding that mirror up and going, Okay, this is where you are, are you comfortable with that kind of conversation.
Sean Ammirati (17:30):
Yeah, that’s great. It’s funny because that is obvious, but I think probably not obvious to the audience, right? Like as you’re saying that, that feels intuitive, right? Like, well, clearly nobody can expect a one out of three batting average, and so three ideas is not enough and that’s a very risky to do. But to your point, going back to the known versus unknown, right, like if people are used to living in a world where the problem and the solution are a bit more known, they may think that a 33% success rate is very defensible. So, that’s awesome.
Sean Ammirati (18:05):
So let’s jump into just the experimentation itself for the kind of back half of the interview here. So you talk about 44 different experiments, or you kind of catalog 44 different experiments. What do you think is most under utilized? Which of those techniques do you think is the least taken advantage of today and underutilized?
David Bland (18:25):
Ooh, that is a great question. There are some that I think provide the most benefit that people don’t do. And I would say-
Sean Ammirati (18:35):
And you don’t have to pick one, like about a couple of them even, if you want.
David Bland (18:37):
Yeah, I would say there are two closely related ones, which are Concierge and Wizard of Oz. And so when you think of Concierge, it’s basically white glove delivering the value to the customer manually, there’s little or no product built around that at all. And Wizard of Oz is very similar to that, except it’s not obvious that a person is, it’s sort of like the book and the movie, right, man behind the curtain kind of thing. And so deeply interacting with a bot or they’re interacting with a page or an app, but it’s like a thinly veneered digital curtain, so to speak. And so those, I feel, are amazing because they give strong strength of evidence, you can really test all three themes. So you can test, will people pay for that thing you delivered? Did they actually enjoy it? Right, give feedback that way. And then can you do it? You know, even if you did it manually in a way that doesn’t scale.
David Bland (19:30):
The push back I get on them, however, is usually around, Well, we don’t have time to do this manually, we have to rush and build and scale the thing. It’s like, Will we have time to build and scale something we’re not sure has fit, but we don’t have time to manually do it without scale and find out is there any evidence? And I feel like that’s something, it’s a constant conversation I’m having with teams, in that, Hey, let’s make space for doing things that don’t scale. And then when we learn from that, we can use that as real evidence to inform our automation and our product design and strategy. And I feel like when they buy into it, it’s awesome because they get to use their creativity, they almost always have a good time and learn from it, but I think the pushback has always been, Well, I’m looking at my calendar and how am I going to respond to people manually for things? It’s quite the like time management challenge that I find.
Sean Ammirati (20:26):
Yeah. Well, and it’s, I think too sometimes, it flushes out commitment questions too, right? Because your calendar reflects your priorities. So like saying that also reflects a question of like, how much do you prioritize the experiment that you’re running and the thing that you’re thinking about. Yeah, I think both of those are very good. Let’s just talk about a couple of different groups in large companies and how you see those groups intersecting with this experimentation around business ideas. So first traditional R&D groups, how should traditional R&D groups think about your testing business concepts?
David Bland (21:05):
Yeah, they’re an interesting bunch. So I end up working with traditional R&D. A lot of my Toyota work was traditional R&D groups, because the innovation group out of Silicon Valley for Toyota. And quite often what I see R&D groups put in a box, it’s like work on some cool tech and then we’ll try to find a business model for it later. And I think one of the things that are slowly changing, although I wish it would change a little more quickly, is let’s think about the job we’re solving for this and the business model that could be something we could run with when we’re in R&D mode. Because basically if you think about your business model canvas, if you model it out, you’re basically playing in this key resources box. And you’re saying we have some cool tech, some R&D that we’ve built, but you still have to jump really quickly to, okay, what’s the value of it? You know, what’s the value prop of it, and then who’s your customer for it, and then what’s your channel and your revenue streams and all that.
David Bland (22:03):
And so I’m not against starting there. I mean, I get pulled into R&D groups quite a bit, but I’m constantly trying to help them think about the business model and think about overall providing traction and evidence, because I think they’re often put in this really challenging situation where they kind of throw their R&D efforts that they’ve built over the wall to another group, and they’re like, Okay, figure out a business model for this. And that’s really challenging to be on the other side of that handoff and say, Well, I wasn’t there for the context and creation of what you did, I don’t understand the why about it and all that, but I’m supposed to create a business model and find a market need for it.
David Bland (22:40):
And so I do see those walls coming down a little bit and those handoffs not being quite as severe, but I think R&D groups can certainly go beyond the feasibility risk conversation to more about, Okay, well, what would the cost and revenue look like? And what would the market look like? Even if it’s still a series of guesses, but put some thought into the design of it, rather than just kind of handing that off and hoping someone else will pick it up. We’ve seen enough over the years fail during that handoff that I think R&D groups that I work with can benefit from thinking about experiments this way in a more general sense.
Sean Ammirati (23:17):
Okay, I want to do two more. That was awesome. So I want to be respectful of your time, David, but I wanted to do two more groups, because that was really interesting. So another one, how should corporate finance think about this concept?
David Bland (23:29):
You know, corporate finance, I love working with them because they do get investment decision aspect of it. I feel like we threw out this term innovation accounting early on in kind of the Lean Startup movement, and then still people have no idea what it means. And so I feel like if it holds up to traditional accounting, there’s a few exceptions out there if people that have put some work into it, but I think if you took the concept of innovation accounting to CFOs, they would just kind of laugh at you because they’re like, What are you talking about?
David Bland (23:56):
And so this idea of paying down risk, you know, if you track the early definition of minimum viable product, it wasn’t necessarily in Eric’s book, it was before that, 2001 with Frank Robinson, and he framed it as risk, and how you de-risk your your investments basically. And I love going back to that original 2001 definition. So when I’m talking with CFOs, it’s more like, Okay, can we frame things up in a way where we have a portfolio and we’re placing bets, and along the way we have these sessions where we talk with people that have budget authority, and we say, Hey, here’s our strategy, the hypothesis we tested, the experiments we ran, the evidence we generated, and here’s our recommendation, whether we pivot, persevere and kill this opportunity. And if we request funding, it’s for funding for more experiments to get to better evidence.
David Bland (24:53):
It’s a hard thing to set up, I will say. We’ve been working at this for quite some time, I’ve seen various degrees of success in corporations on how to do it well, but when it works, I feel like it’s a really interesting dynamic of people going, Oh, here’s what we tried, and this is what we need to move forward and learn about this other risk we have. And, you know, if you have a team that’s aligned with a committee can say, Okay, we agree, or we don’t agree, based on, but it’s a real conversation. And so when I talk to CFOs, it’s more of, Hey, let’s just not throw a hundred people and $10 million at this idea, let’s actually take a more kind of metered approach and use evidence to help guide our investments and give us more flexibility.
David Bland (25:33):
And there aren’t too many CFOs to push back on having more flexibility, it’s just more of the semantics of, or the logistics of getting it sort of structured and up and running, I feel like, we’re still learning a lot there.
Sean Ammirati (25:46):
If someone is listening to this and they’re like, Yeah, I want to learn more about that, is there a place you’d point them to? Is there a book or a post or something, or resource?
David Bland (25:58):
Yeah, there are a couple of things I would pull from Eric’s book, The Startup Way, which is a lot of the teams I coached, and it talks a lot about the efforts of GE and Toyota there. There’s also, in the back of Testing Business Ideas, I give some guidance, and then Alex Osterwalder also has some guidance in his Invincible Company book. There’s not just one like blog post I would point to, but we’re all kind of tackling the same sort of challenge. Also, Tendai Vicky’s book, The Corporate … What is it called? The Corporate Startup, I believe, The Corporate Startup, yeah. It’s a little older, but it’s also holds up from what he was doing as well, and we’re all much like in violent agreement with the principals, we just take, you know, different tactics, but those books should help you start formulating it, but it’s something I view as from a CFO point of view, giving it more flexibility, funding things based on evidence.
David Bland (26:52):
I recently heard an exec say, We’re going to test a thousand ideas over the next five years, and 99% of them will fail. And I thought, Wow, I don’t hear many execs say that, you know, unprovoked or unsolicited. So I think some are slowly coming around to this kind of concept.
Sean Ammirati (27:08):
Yeah, that’s great. Okay. Last group as we go kind of around the org chart here of different places and how they should think about it. So how about people that are more focused on external innovation, whether that’s corporate venture capitalist or these, you know, first customer programs inside these companies that are working with early stage startups. How should they think about specifically these different types of experiments and how they can bring that into their daily job?
David Bland (27:33):
Yeah, so sometimes at a corporation, you know, it doesn’t mean you always have to build these like MVPs yourself. And so quite often when I’m working with ventures groups, they use this lens of like kind of the book to evaluate startups, so I’ve helped in that process as well. And also their NVP might be working with a startup for a specific market test, and so the framing of experiments helps guide that conversation, Okay, we’ve already kind of performed open-ended directional research, and now we’re more in sort of the validation side of the discovery and validation experiments, and we want to use on what we’ve learned to co-create with a startup.
David Bland (28:14):
Now, startups also on the other hand, have to be mindful of this, of, Okay, what’s the IP agreement look like, you know, don’t necessarily go in on like some kind of predatory agreement or anything like that, so I’ve seen kind of both sides. But when it’s kind of mutually beneficial and they can agree, then quite often you can use this thinking to help inform the way you look at external innovation, or the way you partner with startups. It’s not just, Oh wouldn’t it be cool to partner with this startup because they’re gaining market share, it’s more of, We have a hypothesis to test, can we partner with a startup to help generate evidence that this is the right approach? And that’s how I I’ve kind of viewed this, so I do think there’s some nuggets that they can pull out of the book as far as how they kind of look at startups and how they vet them, but also how they view them as more of a partner in co-creation for a specific kind of validation experiment.
Sean Ammirati (29:09):
That was awesome. David, I really appreciate you taking a quick journey through this. Again, we’ll include in the show notes, a link to David’s book which he wrote with Alex Osterwalder, Testing Business Ideas, but encourage you to check that out and also follow David. To that end, David, what’s the best place for people to stay aware of the work that you’re doing?
David Bland (29:30):
Yeah, I’m pretty active on all the socials. So my site, Precoil.com, P-R-E-C-O-I-L.com, is a great resource. I’m also pretty active on Twitter, on Instagram, now on Clubhouse. We’ll see how long that lasts, but I’ve been answering literally like one-hour Q &A’s, ask me anythings there, which has been great. So I’m pretty active online, Twitter, Instagram, Clubhouse, LinkedIn, all the socials. So just kind of search for me, you’ll find me.
Sean Ammirati (29:56):
All right, we’ll include those links as well. Thanks so much, David, have a great day.
David Bland (29:56):
Thanks for having me.
Sean Ammirati (30:06):
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